ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

INTRODUCTION
The United States was a latecomer to the negotiation and conclusion of BITs. While Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and other European nations began concluding BITs 20 years earlier, 1 the United States did not sign its first BIT, with Panama, until 1982, 2 with several others signed in 1983 following the conclusion of the first US model BIT. 3 However, unlike some of the early European BITs, which did not include ISDS, 4 from the outset, the US BITs incorporated (albeit in considerably different form from more modern treaties) mandatory third-party arbitration mechanisms to resolve disputes between foreign investors and host countries. 5 Most US BITs (47) were concluded between 1983 and 2000 by the Reagan, George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations. 6 Only two, with Uruguay and 6 See US BITs, supra note 2.
Rwanda, have been concluded since 2000. 7 The Obama administration has concluded no BITs to date, but is pursuing one with China. 8 It was not an accident that all US BITs contained ISDS provisions. In addition to the US Government's desire to afford greater protection for US investors in developing countries, a significant driving force behind the United States' decision to abandon the formal or informal espousal process that had been followed in recent years (such as in Latin America in the 1970s), was the objective of making available a third-party process that would allow the United States to avoid espousal in most circumstances and thus remove investment disputes from the forefront of bilateral and regional relations (and significant inter-agency disputes 9 ), as with Peru and other members of the Organization of American States during the 1968-1976 period. 10 The movement toward investment agreements also benefitted foreign investors, who might have lost their investment if diplomatic intervention had been unsuccessful and, at least indirectly, the host countries who concluded investment agreements in the hope that it would stimulate investment.
US Government support of ISDS in FTAs (or in BITs with some FTA parties) has been consistent, despite extensive public and Congressional opposition since the negotiation and conclusion of NAFTA 11 by the George H. W. Bush administration, 12 and despite the fact that there is little hard evidence that BITs, as distinct from other factors creating a favourable investment climate, encourage foreign investment. The Clinton administration negotiated only one FTA, with Jordan, and it contained no investment provisions because of a recent separate BIT between the United States and Jordan. 13 (The 1985 FTA with Israel, negotiated by the Reagan administration, contains no investment provisions, and no BIT exists between the United States and Israel.) However, the George W. Bush administration proceeded to negotiate more than a dozen FTAs, covering 17 countries. With only one exception (Australia 14 ), these FTAs contain investment protections with ISDS, except for those FTAs with countries (such as Bahrain) with pre-existing BITs. 15 The Obama administration's one and only FTA, the TPP, includes ISDS provisions applicable to all parties including Australia, albeit with some exceptions. 16 A major feature of the negotiations of the TPP (and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership [TTIP] as well) is the fact that many of the other negotiating parties are developed rather than developing nations -a major departure from prior US practice -with the dual exceptions of the inclusion of Canada in NAFTA and the bilateral FTA with Singapore. This belies, to a considerable extent, the argument that ISDS is necessary only with nations that lack independent court systems and/or adherence to the rule of law.
US BITs have not been, for the most part, particularly controversial. This is presumably due in large part to the following: all US BITs have been with developing nations, mostly small ones, or the nations of Eastern Europe, which at the time were developing or emerging market nations; the obligations, 7 Ibid. including ISDS, are reciprocal but the likelihood is minimal that, for example, a Uruguayan enterprise would demand arbitration of a claim against the US Government; and BITs are concluded as treaties, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the senators present and voting. 17 As the provisions of US BITs are considered either self-executing or enforceable through existing legislation, 18 the House of Representatives typically has no direct role in their approval. Controversy arose primarily during the negotiation (or revision) of model BITs in 2004 and 2012, where the dialogue between business interests on one side and organized labour and environmentalists on the other was predictable, and well after the first of the NAFTA Chapter 11 actions against the United States had made headlines and empowered opponents of ISDS who feared, inter alia, interference with regulatory actions.
Still, the most significant debates have been in the context of the TPA legislation enacted in 2002 and re-enacted only in 2015. The possible conclusion of BIT negotiations between the United States and China, under way for more than five years but with the negotiations progressing only recently, 19 will likely raise the ISDS controversy to a previously unknown level if and when a BIT text is concluded and made public, as discussed in the section on the TPP. Significantly, the defenders of ISDS, principally the US Government and the US business community, have focused more extensively on the many modifications to the NAFTA model incorporated in all US FTAs and BITs concluded since 2003, while most of the opponents (including libertarian groups such as the Cato Institute) largely ignore the changes, directing their opposition instead toward the perceived undesirability of ISDS (and protection of US investments abroad) more generally.
The next part of this paper ("Pre-BIT/ISDS Era: Diplomatic Protection and its Discontents") continues with a brief discussion of the period 1965-1980 in particular, which was dominated by a formal or informal "espousal" process (in which the US Government negotiated individual claims settlements 20 with various governments, in particular Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela in South America), and by controversies over US policies, including economic sanctions, designed to protect US investors abroad from expropriation (or, from another point of view, to coerce foreign governments into paying compensation for expropriated properties). The third part ("The United States Embraces BITs (with ISDS): 1983-2000)" discusses the late and somewhat cautious US embrace of BITs, and conclusion of more than 40 such agreements, the vast majority during the 1980s and 1990s. The fourth part ("ISDS in US FTAs: NAFTA, Chapter 11") focuses on NAFTA Chapter 11, including the provisions that have created controversy; the apparently unexpected experience of the United States as a respondent in ISDS; and the ensuing re-evaluation by both the US Government and opposition groups concerned with the adverse implications of the potential challenges by foreign investors, such as the threat to "legitimate" government regulatory actions.
The penultimate section of this paper ("ISDS in FTAs: From the 2002 TPA to the 2015 TPA") views the post-NAFTA modifications to the investment chapter model, beginning with the 2002 TPA legislation and the US-Singapore and US-Chile FTAs. This section also discusses the factors that led to changes in the investment provisions of these FTAs, principally as reflected in the 2002 TPA legislation -with its negotiating objectives applicable to, among other things, investment provisions -and in subsequent policy documents, such as the May 2007 Bipartisan Trade Deal (BTD). This part of the paper also discusses the debates over the 2015 TPA legislation and the actual text of the negotiating objectives adopted by Congress and signed by the president in June 2015.
The final section ("The Latest Act: The TPP") addresses the recently concluded TPP negotiations, which were directly or indirectly dependent on the enactment of the TPA legislation at the end of June 2015. 
PRE-BIT/ISDS ERA: DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
For the United States, a principal function of BITs was a means of supporting customary international law, creating "an instrument of US legal policy which was responsive to the unique issues facing private foreign investment in developing countries" so as to reinforce "congenial and stable legal standards for the protection of US investment in the developing world." 21 Protection of US foreign investment abroad, primarily in developing nations, has been a hallmark of US international economic policy at least since the early 1960s, with various efforts to establish the international law principle of "prompt, adequate and effective compensation" following on the Cuban and Brazilian expropriations. 22 There was no practice until much later -in NAFTA -of including other capital-exporting nations (Canada) within the protections offered by ISDS.
As noted earlier, the United States was hardly in the forefront in seeking to protect increasing US investment in developing countries. European practice was well known to State Department officials (and presumably to private US enterprises as well) as a "proven success story" by the 1970s, 23 even if the earlier European BIT versions did not necessarily provide for ISDS. This, and the fact that the dozens of earlier US "friendship, commerce and negotiation" treaties (most with limited or no investment protection obligations) were, for various reasons, a poor model for concluding treaties with developing nations, led the State Department to begin a process that would lead to a model BIT and multiple negotiations. Other driving forces toward BITs may have included business community frustration with Carter administration neutrality on foreign investment issues, and concerns that many developing countries were increasing restrictions on inward investment 24 in the aftermath of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. This charter, among other provisions that were generally opposed by capital-exporting nations, provided for permanent sovereignty over natural resources and for compensating owners of expropriated property in domestic courts solely in accordance with domestic law (effectively excluding any minimum standards of international law).
25
In addition to these considerations, further benefits of independent third-party arbitration also existed. In the late 1960s and 1970s, when expropriation disputes were legion among US investors and various Latin American governments (Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela, in particular), investors who lacked recourse to international arbitration and (often with good reason) distrusted national courts regularly sought assistance from the State and Treasury Departments in negotiating settlement arrangements for payment of compensation. 26 In the author's experience, this inevitably put the disputes, whether formally or informally espoused, at the forefront of US bilateral relations with the host country. Such a result was virtually assured by the existence of US legislation that suspended bilateral foreign assistance, US support for loans from the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, and tariff preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences for uncompensated expropriations.
27
Whether to take a hard line with expropriating governments or a more diplomatic approach, and whether to depart from the concept of "prompt, adequate and effective compensation" through a US government-negotiated settlement at something closer to book value, was also a subject of intense discussion and often bitter inter-agency and executive branch-Congress disputes led by the Treasury Department and State Department. 28 
21
Gudgeon, supra note 3 at 110. With the strong support of the Reagan administration, nine BITs were completed during that period, and another dozen were concluded during the George H. W. Bush administration. 35 The golden age of US BITs was the period 1993-2000, when the Clinton administration concluded 24 such agreements, including several with what are now EU member nations, although, in fairness to the first Bush administration, negotiations for many of those were begun before 1993. 36 None of these were concluded with what at the time were considered developed countries, and relatively few were controversial, perhaps because by the early 1990s the focus of opposition to ISDS had shifted to NAFTA, in particular its Chapter 19 (for binational panel review of administrative determinations in unfair trade cases) and to broader dislike by many in the Democratic Party of any further FTAs, including but not limited to ISDS provisions. This situation is reflected by the fact that President Clinton's "fast track" authority expired after a one-year extension in April 1994 (to permit the procedures to be used for approval by Congress of the Uruguay Round agreements) and was never renewed, partly for lack of advocacy by the Clinton administration during its second term and in part because of both Democratic and Republican Party opposition. 37 Accordingly, in the section that follows, the focus of the discussion shifts to FTA chapters from BITs.
ISDS IN US FTAS: NAFTA, CHAPTER 11 38
Including Chapter 11 in NAFTA was not a radical move for the United States. The sources were the United States-Canada FTA (for the obligations-to-investors language, but without ISDS), the various US BITs and the 1992 model BIT. 39 The inclusion in NAFTA of a compulsory third-party arbitration procedure to settle investment disputes, along with international law standards for the treatment of foreign investment, must have been seen as a major achievement for the Department of State, the Treasury Department and the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), as well as for the business community, considering that it overcame many decades of Mexico's adherence to the Calvo Clause 40 and a long and troubled history of investment disputes between Mexico and the United States, including the petroleum industry expropriation in 1938. 41 What was radical was the inclusion, for the first time, of ISDS in an agreement with another developed nation -that is, Canada.
FTA investment chapters, Chapter 11 of NAFTA in particular, have generated extensive controversy based on both the major substantive provisions (national treatment, fair and equitable treatment, and expropriation, among others) and the interpretation and application of such provisions in specific instances, as well as with regard to frequent ISDS. The reasons are obvious. Over 22 years, NAFTA has generated more than 50 ISDS claims. Of the 17 against the United States, only seven have reached the award stage, and the United States has yet to be required to pay an award to a foreign claimant.
42
The most relevant fact for this discussion is that the majority of the claims, some 35 (including notices of arbitration for cases that were never pursued), have been filed and, in many instances, litigated between two developed nations, investors of the United States against Canada, and vice versa. 43 (In contrast, as far as the author has been able to determine, only one case has been brought by a foreign investor under any BIT or any other FTA investment chapter against the United States, and in two and a half years the latter proceeding, under the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement [CAFTA-DR], has not progressed beyond the "notice of intent to arbitrate" stage.
44 )
The most vocal government and NGO (and some state government) concerns have centred on the preservation of government authority to regulate (to preserve the environment or to support public health and safety, in particular) without facing liability for such actions. They also relate to the allegations that foreign investors in the United States have greater rights to compensation than US citizens under the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution.
Because literature elsewhere extensively analyzes the NAFTA and post-NAFTA changes in investment chapters, 45 this paper's discussion of such changes is restricted to the highlights: changes in provisions relating to fair and equitable treatment, expropriation, transparency in the arbitral proceedings and various procedural issues designed to eliminate frivolous claims from the outset, except as noted below.
The Substance
Judging from the cases litigated under NAFTA and the attacks on Chapter 11, the most significant and controversial investors' protections in Chapter 11, section A, are the rights to national treatment, fair and equitable treatment and to fair compensation in the event of expropriation or nationalization, direct or indirect.
46 (Many cases have turned on national treatment and non-discrimination under article 1102, but the application of the requirement has been more straightforward, despite some issues of interpretation, and the language in subsequent agreements does not vary materially from NAFTA.
47
) Tribunals established under Chapter 11 "decide the issues in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of international law."
48 Because these three articles are most relevant to the subsequent discussion, the pertinent language is set out below. (d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6 [fair market value].
These are the core protections for foreign investors and those most frequently invoked in ISDS, as reflected in the cases discussed in this paper.
As with other FTAs and BITs, NAFTA, Chapter 11, section B, provides a detailed mechanism designed to facilitate binding resolution of investment disputes through compulsory arbitration, 49 normally through the World Bank's ICSID Additional Facility 50 or under the arbitral rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The ICSID Additional Facility is available if only one state in the dispute (the host state or the investor's home state) is a party to the convention.
51
These mechanisms are not mandatory for the foreign investor who may elect to submit disputes to the local courts.
52 NAFTA includes the essential elements of the ISDS process: the investor's choice of arbitration before ICSID, through the ICSID Additional Facility or under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; the three-year statute of limitations; and the "choice in the road" between national court litigation and international arbitration. None have changed markedly in US FTAs since NAFTA. 53 Among the possible constraints on arbitrators, the NAFTA parties reserved the right to issue interpretations of the provisions of the agreement, with the proviso that "An interpretation by the Commission of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this Section." 54 One limitation in NAFTA that was changed in 2003 is reflected in the fact that NAFTA's ISDS provisions make no specific mention of investment authorizations or investment agreements, contracts with the governments as, for example, for government procurement (excluded from coverage under article 1108), although ISDS jurisdiction exists over monopolies and state enterprises where "the monopoly has acted in a manner inconsistent with the Party's obligations under Section A [the investor protections] and that the investor has incurred loss or damage by reason, or rising out of, that breach." 55 In addition to the key provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11, concerns surfaced over the lack of transparency in "secret" ISDS proceedings and concerns over the perception that foreign investors through NAFTA and subsequent agreements had acquired greater rights than US investors had under US courts, both as discussed below, as well as worries that an arbitral tribunal would join procedural issues with the substance of the claims, resulting in a prolongation of the process (and the associated costs), even where the claim is ultimately dismissed.
Emerging Opposition to ISDS under NAFTA
Opposition to NAFTA generally was broad, well before the negotiations were concluded. Recall Ross Perot's "giant sucking sound" and the Perot-Gore vice-presidential debate, most of which focused on a potential loss of jobs rather than dispute settlement. 56 Even the environmental groups had not yet focused on ISDS.
57 But, as Paul Krugman suggested in its defence, NAFTA could not at the time be "understood in terms of the real content or likely consequences of the agreement." Rather, he said:
[T]he hard-core opposition to NAFTA is rooted in a modern populism that desperately wants to defend industrial America against the forces that are transforming us into a service economy. International trade in general, and trade with Mexico in particular, have very little to do with those forces; clinging to the four percent average tariff the United States currently levies on imports of manufactures from Mexico might save a few low-wage industrial jobs for a little while, but it would do almost nothing to stop or even slow the long-run trends that are the real concern of NAFTA's opponents. 58 In a broad defence of NAFTA, the Heritage Foundation in April 1993 focused on many issues other than dispute settlement, noting that both liberal and conservative critics of NAFTA argued that the agreement infringes on national sovereignty and limits local power to control laws, enforce environmental standards, and uphold health and safety regulations. 59 The foundation suggested in response that the mechanisms would "give US citizens and businesses more direct participation in resolving commercial, environmental and investment disputes between the three countries, by allowing them their day in court." Yet, there was little mention of investment disputes; the Heritage Foundation focused on Chapter 19 (unfair trade disputes) and Chapter 20 (state-to-state disputes).
60
More explicit opposition to Chapter 11 did not spread until after the first Chapter 11 case was filed by the Ethyl Corporation, in April 1997. 61 The process was publicly attacked by a prominent anti-trade NGO, Public Citizen: "Ethyl Corporation's $251 million lawsuit against a new Canadian environmental law should set off alarm bells throughout the public interest world. The suit, brought under the terms of the North American Free Trade Agreement, demonstrates the serious danger that present and future international economic pacts could pose to environmental regulations and other laws that protect the public." 62 While the Ethyl case was settled in the aftermath of a finding by a federal (Canadian) disputesettlement arbitration panel, 63 the controversy generated and the concerns of opponents were ongoing, in particular with regard to the Methanex and Loewen cases against the United States (discussed below) and the Pope and Talbot and SD Myers cases against Canada.
The Impact of Chapter 11 Litigation
The ensuing NAFTA-based litigation changed many views. As Mark Clodfelter (who was a senior US State Department official at the time of NAFTA's signing) commented seven years after the agreement entered into force, the United States Government, and for that matter Canada and Mexico, …took a very big step into the unknown when they signed onto Chapter 11. The NAFTA Parties have waived sovereign immunity from claims to an extent far greater than they have consented to the jurisdiction, for example, of the International Court of Justice. They have agreed to be answerable to private claimants before arbitral tribunals that are subject to only very limited review. Even though the United States has been party to a fair number of BITs, which have arrangements resembling Chapter 11, we have never done so with states that have so much investment in our territory. 64 This was radical, because the United States had never concluded a BIT in the past with another developed country, although that aspect of the coverage of Chapter 11 does not appear to have received much US government attention until well after the fact, when thoughtful officials such as Clodfelter commented on it. Most of the controversies that have led to at least some re-evaluation of US Government support of investment disputes fall into one of several areas. First, there are disputes arising from conflicts between trade and "legitimate" government regulatory action, including but not limited to actions protecting the environment. Many of these disputes cented on the expropriation provision, article 1110 as set out above. Second, concerns exist, primarily among NGOs and some members of Congress, regarding the appropriateness of having NAFTA tribunals effectively review decisions of US state and federal courts. Third, there exists an articulated concern, albeit probably unjustified, by the same NGOs and their supporters in Congress, that foreign citizens may have achieved greater substantive rights regarding investment in US territory under NAFTA than American citizens have under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution.
67 Fourth, broad concerns are expressed over the lack of transparency of the arbitral process. Under the original NAFTA Chapter 11 -before modifications in 2001 and 2003 -the proceedings, including the pleadings and hearings, were conducted largely in secret.
The Methanex case 68 aptly illustrates the concerns by the NAFTA governments and civil society over "regulatory takings" that could require compensation. The Canadian firm Methanex challenged the action of the State of California in banning the gasoline additive methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE) because of the perceived risk that it might pollute the underground water supply. These measures were characterized by the claimant, both directly and indirectly, as "tantamount to expropriation." The arbitral tribunal did not ultimately reach the question of whether California's action constituted a compensable taking under article 1110. Rather, it determined that the connection between the California MTBE ban and Methanex's operations was not "legally significant"; that is, it did not satisfy the "relating to" language in article 1101. (Methanex manufactured methanol, the primary component of MTBE, not MTBE itself.) Ultimately, the tribunal dismissed all claims by Methanex against the United States on the merits, rejecting as well Methanex's claims of violations of both national treatment, and fair and equitable treatment.
69
Anti-NAFTA groups in the United States had also seized on the Loewen case as "an all-out attack on democracy…[that] would undermine the jury system, which is fundamental to our system of justice." 70 In Loewen, a Louisiana state court trial -conducted with obvious prejudice to the Canadian investor -rendered a state anti-trust verdict against Loewen (a Canadian operator of funeral homes in Louisiana). The jury found a few million dollars' worth of actual damages, plus approximately $400 million in punitive damages. 71 Because the claimant apparently could not meet bonding requirements for an appeal, set at $625 million under Louisiana law, Loewen settled the case for $175 million "under conditions of extreme duress." Eventually it brought a Chapter 11 claim against the United States. Among Loewen's contentions was that actions of the Louisiana trial court, the excessive monetary judgment and the bonding requirements amounted to a denial of justice and of fair and equitable treatment by the Louisiana courts in violation of article 1105 and of customary international law. The arbitral proceedings were initially dismissed on procedural grounds, with the tribunal holding that availability of the Chapter 11 mechanism had been lost when Loewen, in bankruptcy, transferred its interests to a US firm. In extensive dicta, the tribunal analyzed the Louisiana state court proceedings at considerable length, characterizing them as a "disgrace." However, the tribunal nevertheless concluded in further dicta that (in addition to the corporate claimant losing its Canadian nationality) the decision was not cognizable under NAFTA and international law because Loewen had not received a final court verdict within the US court system, and there had thus not been a denial of justice.
A subsequent ruling by the arbitral tribunal, after Raymond Loewen, one of the claimants, asserted his continuous Canadian citizenship, necessarily resulted in a decision on the merits, converting the earlier dictum into a holding that the action of the Mississippi court did not meet the international law threshold of a denial of justice for lack of national judicial remedies.
A few years later, evidence surfaced that one of the arbitrators in Loewen, former congressman and US appellate court judge Abner Mikva, had been improperly influenced by the US Department of Justice while serving on the tribunal. As Judge Mikva related the incident at a conference in 2004, a Justice Department official had said to him, "You know, Judge, if we lose this case, we could lose NAFTA." Mikva recounted his answer as, "Well, if you want to put pressure on me, then that does it." 72 This remarkable exchange confirms the extraordinary level of concern felt by US government officials when the United States was respondent in controversial ISDS proceedings (and may explain a puzzling, pro-US Government result in a case that many observers expected to be won by Loewen).
Of course, whether the regulatory actions such as those challenged in Methanex and attacks on state court decisions, as in Loewen, are "valid" is to be determined by the adjudicatory process. However, the mere possibility that they might do so was enough to lead the American private sector and US Government to the barricades. For example, environmental groups have been highly critical of the repeated use of investor protection provisions "to challenge the host country's environmental laws and administrative decisions," noting that "the provisions designed to ensure security and predictability for the investors have created uncertainty and unpredictability for environmental regulators. Certain changes in ISDS procedures that arguably did not require amendment of NAFTA were made by the NAFTA parties in response to public criticism of the process. In July 2001, the NAFTA parties issued an "interpretation" as permitted under Chapter 11, declaring that NAFTA did not require the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings and pledging with a few exceptions to make all arbitral documents "available to the public in a timely manner." 75 (Business confidential information and privileged governmental information was to remain confidential, in both pleadings and hearings.) Fully two years later, after the enactment of the TPA legislation in 2002 (discussed below), the United States (and Canada) stated that they would consent to opening hearings in Chapter 11 disputes. 76 The NAFTA parties also attempted, in the interpretation, to limit the scope of the minimum standard of treatment under article 1105 by emphasizing, inter alia, that, "The concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security' do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens." 79 (This clarification was designed to deal in part with the apparently inadvertent omission of "customary" before "international law" in article 1105.) This interpretation language has also been included in subsequent US FTAs and BITs, as discussed below. The statutory negotiating objectives in the TPA, one of the benefits for Congress in the TPA compromise, thus become critical since if they are not followed Congress may well refuse to approve the resulting agreement (although to date this has not occurred under the TPA). As the Congressional Research Service describes the situation with the TPA,"To take the fullest advantage of these benefits, Congress, drawing on its constitutional authority and historical precedent, defined the objectives that the President is to pursue in trade negotiations. Although the executive branch has some discretion over implementing these goals, they are definitive statements of US trade policy that the Administration is expected to honor, if it expects trade agreement implementing legislation to be considered under expedited rules. For this reason, trade negotiating objectives stand at the center of the congressional debate on TPA."
ISDS IN FTAS: FROM THE
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In the debate, the pro-investment protection contingent of business and government have generally prevailed on the basic principles needed to protect American investors abroad, although groups advocating the inclusion of strong labour rights and environmental provisions also succeeded to the extent of having them included in the TPA, 83 albeit without the right to bring labour and environmental actions directly against parties to the agreements. Still, beginning with the 2002 TPA, the investment protection pendulum swung to a very significant degree toward host governments and away from unfettered investor rights. With regard to investment, many major changes from the NAFTA approach were ultimately adopted. These included, inter alia, provisions related to minimum standard of treatment; Following the enactment of the 2002 TPA, in the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, an exchange of letters constituting part of the agreement was added, designed to restrict significantly and legally the scope of the "indirect" expropriation provisions as they may apply to government regulatory activities:
1. Article 15.6(1) (Expropriation) is intended to reflect customary international law concerning the obligation of States with respect to expropriation.
2. An action or a series of actions by a Party cannot constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property right or property interest in an investment.
3. Article 15.6(1) (Expropriation) addresses two situations. The first is direct expropriation, where an investment is nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated through formal transfer of title or outright seizure.
4. The second situation addressed by Article 15.6(1) (Expropriation) is indirect expropriation, where an action or series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure.
(a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action.
(b) Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.
88
The focus was on protecting "legitimate" government regulatory actions from being treated as compensable indirect expropriations, in part through incorporating US takings law, reflecting the TPA language that foreign investors not be "accorded greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than United States investors in the United States." Thus, subparagraphs 4 (a) (i) to (iii) were based on Penn Central, a US Supreme Court case involving an unsuccessful action against New York City claiming that restricting air rights above the terminal (where the claimant had wanted to build a skyscraper) was not a compensable taking in part because it did not deprive Penn Central of reasonable economic use of its property. 89 The negotiators presumably looked as well at other Supreme Court precedents, such as Lucas, where the court found a compensable taking when the government action deprived the claimant of all economically viable use of his land. 90 The subparagraph 4(b) "except in rare circumstances" language was apparently intended to be a clear statement, also reflecting US Supreme Court jurisprudence, that in the absence of discrimination a presumption exists that the listed regulatory actions will not be treated as compensable expropriations by arbitral tribunals. This language also reflects the requirement in the 2002 TPA that foreign investors not be accorded greater substantive rights than US citizens litigating in US courts. 91 (Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch nevertheless criticized the language because it afforded tribunals "discretion . . . to find a non-discriminatory public interest police action required compensation."
92 ) The assumption appears to have been that for many other countries, including Canada (which has no constitutionally mandated Fifth Amendment to protect private property), the protection offered by investment agreements does, in fact, provide broader substantive rights than local law and constitutions, in particular in nations where the rule of law is weak. The concept of "reasonable investment-backed expectations" also remains.
The troublesome concept of fair and equitable treatment also received additional language in the Singapore FTA (and all subsequent US FTA investment chapters) to define and limit its scope:
For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights. The obligation in paragraph 1 to provide: hearings, publication on the Internet of all pleadings not containing business confidential or privileged information. 95 Thus, the US-Singapore FTA provides that the "tribunal shall conduct hearings open to the public..." and that all notices and pleadings shall be made available to the public. Reflecting paragraph (F) of the TPA, it states, "The tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from any persons and entities in the territories of the Parties and from interested persons and entities outside the territories of the Parties." 96 The Singapore FTA also provides that, "Without prejudice to a tribunal's authority to address other objections as a preliminary question, a tribunal shall address and decide as a preliminary question any objection by the respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim submitted is not a claim for which an award in favor of the claimant may be made," in an attempt (reflecting the lengthy Methanex proceedings) to convince arbitral tribunals to resolve procedural issues at the outset. 97 It also expanded slightly the proviso relating to party interpretations, stating not only that "a decision issued by the Joint Committee under paragraph 1 shall be binding on the tribunal," but adding that "any award must be consistent with that decision." 98 Both the Singapore and Chile FTAs also include new language in the ISDS provisions that explicitly covers investment authorizations and investment agreements. 99 Such language has been consistently included in subsequent US FTAs, such as the US-Korea FTA (KORUS) and the TPP. 103 The debates over this multilateral process, and the results insofar as investment and ISDS are concerned, did not differ significantly from those relating to the 2002 TPA and thus will not be discussed at any length. It is, however, worth noting that the extensive treatment given to labour and environmental matters in the 2002 TPA and FTAs with Singapore and Chile, among others, are not replicated in the 2004 model BIT. In fact, there are no significant changes in the environmental provisions carried over from NAFTA, 104 and the labour provisions simply mention the core International Labour Organization (ILO) labour principles, while stopping short of the contents of contemporary FTAs. 105 BITs, unlike FTAs with their many additional chapters, including state-to-state arbitration of disputes, typically lack a practical mechanism for enforcing labour and environmental obligations, except through diplomatic consultations.
BTD and the FTAs with Colombia, Panama, Peru and South Korea
The focus of the BTD negotiated between the Bush administration and the Democratic Congress was not on investment. Rather, it reflected the unhappiness of Democratic members with the Bush administration's refusal to include in its FTAs a level of labour and environmental protection that Democrats believed was contemplated under 2002 TPA negotiating authority, such as subjecting such DAVID A. GANTZ • 17 disputes to the same trade sanctions applicable for violation of the trade provisions of the agreements, 106 rather than an "annual monetary assessment" of limited scope and amount. 107 While few of the critics appear to have expected parity, in which labour groups would have standing to bring actions directly against other parties to the agreement, they did expect that the US Government would have both the means and the will to pursue labour and environmental violations under the state-to-state dispute settlement provisions contained in all US FTAs. The only investment-related provision in the BTD stated that "[t]he preamble provision [in the FTA] would recognize that foreign investors in the United States will not be accorded greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than United States investors in the United States." 108 This language was not only substantively redundant in light of the earlier discussion, but also the fact that it was to be preambular language presumably reflected a compromise in Congress between those who saw it as unnecessary and those who would have preferred to include it in the body of the investment chapter.
As a result of these BTD-mandated changes, which were incorporated into amendments to the pending FTAs with Peru, Colombia, Panama and South Korea, the FTA with Peru was promptly approved in November 2007 and went into force the following year. The other three were not approved by Congress until late 2011 and entered into force in 2012.
The 2012 US Model BIT
The 2012 model BIT, 109 despite its three years in gestation and resumption of the debate between pro-and anti-ISDS contingents, made relatively minor changes to the 2004 model BIT. 110 As the State Department explained, "The Administration made several important changes to the BIT text so as to enhance transparency and public participation; sharpen the disciplines that address preferential treatment to state-owned enterprises, including the distortions created by certain indigenous innovation policies; and strengthen protections relating to labor and the environment." 111 This new model BIT attempts to deal more effectively with the market distortions created by state-owned enterprises and includes for the first time labour and environmental provisions similar to those that have appeared in recent FTAs (without enforcement mechanisms) 112 but not in agreements such as the BIT with Rwanda, noted earlier. Financial services provisions are also revised somewhat, reflecting those in the Rwanda BIT, including expedited procedures to deal with the "prudential" exception for host country regulation of financial services. 113 Many of the suggestions advanced by critics during the BIT review, such as limiting coverage to direct expropriations, and restricting the scope of fair and equitable treatment to the standard espoused by the NAFTA governments (asserting that the customary international law on fair and equitable treatment has not changed since the Neer case in 1926), or to limit national treatment to "clear" cases of discrimination, along with more radical efforts to gut traditional BIT language, were rejected by the Obama administration. 114 Substituting state-to-state arbitration for ISDS, recommended by some (presumably those who are less concerned by the history of host government interference in such disputes, as set out in the second part of this article) was also rejected, with the ISDS provisions of the 2012 model BIT reflecting the model 2004 BIT and the four most recent Bush administration FTA investment chapters. 115 As far as the author is aware, no serious proposal for a government-togovernment investment court was advanced at any time during this period, perhaps because of the recent (1998) failure of efforts by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to negotiate a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (although that text contemplated more traditional ISDS rather than other alternatives), 116 or simply because of traditional US reluctance to create new international "courts."
117 Efforts at ICSID and elsewhere to create an appellate mechanism for investorstate disputes similar to the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) highly successful Appellate Body have made absolutely no progress.
ISDS and the 2015 TPA
The debate over the TPA during the first half of 2015 was perhaps the most vituperative and public in history. Because of the timing, opposition to the TPA has been difficult to separate from opposition to the TPP, in particular where investment issues and transparency have been at the forefront. This has probably been due to several factors. These include:
• the widespread use of the Internet and social media, which has facilitated the ease with which critics can make their views widely known;
• the decision of Senator Elizabeth Warren (Democrat, Massachusetts), a former Harvard law professor and a brilliant liberal voice with many admirers, to assume the leadership of the antitrade, anti-ISDS, anti-TPA and anti-TPP forces in the Senate 118 and among the public; and
• the decision of the Obama administration to wait until the beginning of 2014 to request the new authority (TPA) from the Congress.
These factors virtually guaranteed that the TPA opponents would be able to join TPP opponents to present a united front. 119 The anti-TPA/anti-TPP/anti-trade agreement campaign mounted by the labour unions and the supporters in Congress was more effective (even though it ultimately failed) than at any time in the past in initially blocking TPA, again in part because they had ample time to organize their opposition using social media, as well as because public concerns over the negative effects of past FTAs on American workers, whether or not accurate, were probably more pronounced in 2015 than at any time in the past.
In addition, other traditional players such as Public Citizen, organized labour and the Peterson Institute, as well as groups of academics, also participated extensively. The critics have likely benefited from the roundly criticized USTR practice of shrouding the TPP and TTIP negotiations in secrecy, disclosing the substance of the negotiations only to a few hundred members of advisory committees, only a few of which include representatives of labour and environmental groups. The members of Congress and the Senate who eventually may be required to vote TPP up or down but not amend it, along with key staff members, have in fact had the opportunity to view the negotiating texts, albeit under closely monitored conditions. Also, under the TPA-like procedures followed by the USTR, they have been able to participate in regular consultations and in the negotiations. Still, even former USTR officials argue that there should be a "better balance between retaining flexibility for negotiators and keeping the public informed during the process." As of February 2016, when the agreement was signed, the anti-trade, anti-ISDS coalition remained well positioned and appeared to be ready to continue the battle over the TPP, if and when it is submitted to Congress for approval.
This subsection focuses on the substantive aspects of the TPA, and within the TPA on the investment debate, but parts of it are inevitably applicable to the TPP and TTIP as well. She denounced discrimination, whereby American labour unions seeking action against Vietnamese violations of trade agreements would have to make their case in Vietnamese courts. 123 The latter assertion was a misrepresentation, innocent or otherwise. However, the underlying discrimination argument was valid. While the inclusion of labour provisions in the TPP (and the TPA negotiating objectives) would subject Vietnam to dispute settlement under the state-to-state provisions of the TPP should Vietnam fail to enforce effectively its labour laws and the core ILO labour standards, 124 unlike investors who can bring disputes directly against foreign government under the investment chapters, labour disputes can be brought only where the labour advocates in the United States convince the US Government to bring a case. Warren's attack on ISDS also mentioned the controversial Vattenfall and Philip Morris ISDS proceedings, and complained, "Giving foreign corporations special rights to challenge our laws outside of our legal system would be a bad deal. If a final TPP agreement includes Investor-State Dispute Settlement, the only winners will be multinational corporations." 125 Warren, it should be pointed out, was not a member of the Senate Finance Committee where the TPA legislation was drafted, and apparently took no part in the negotiations over its language. However, she did propose an (unsuccessful) amendment to the TPA legislation that would have removed fast-track protection for any trade agreement containing ISDS. 126 Thus, like other ISDS opponents, Warren chose to challenge the ISDS system rather than suggest possible further improvements over the significant changes already being advocated by the Obama administration.
Defenders of the TPA and ISDS were energetic. The director of the president's National Economic Council, Jeffrey Zients, responded respectfully and in extensive detail to Warren, noting that, "[T]he purpose of ISDS is to provide American individuals and business who do business abroad with the same protections we provide to domestic and foreign investors alike in the United States . . . ISDS does not undermine US sovereignty, change US law, nor grant any new substantive rights to multinational companies." 127 Zients further noted that foreign courts do not always respect US constitutional principles or act in an unbiased or non-discriminatory manner, emphasizing that "over the last 50 years, 180 countries have entered into more than 3,000 agreements that provide investment protections." Moreover, he stressed that "[the] TPP will make it absolutely clear that governments can regulate in the public interest, including with regard to health, safety and the environment, and narrowing the definition of what kinds of injuries investors can seek compensation for." 128 He did not address the question of discrimination in terms of standing between labour interests and private investors. Given Warren's well-articulated opposition to Wall Street and business interests in general, she, like many other Democrats, ultimately sees BITs and FTA investment provisions as making it easier for US enterprises to move jobs abroad. 129 Others, such as Gary Hufbauer, were less diplomatic, simply accusing Warren of relying on false information: "These [Warren's] claims, and some other criticisms of the TPP, have no foundation in the long history of ISDS provisions that have been in existence for more than 50 years." 130 Former chief judge of the International Court of Justice and frequent international arbitrator Stephen Schwebel, long a defender of BITs, reiterated recently his defence of ICSID and BITs generally while criticizing the European Commission and Germany for proposing to exclude ISDS from the TTIP, strongly questioning the idea of a "legitimacy crisis" 131 but largely ignoring questions of arbitrator conflicts of interests raised by many who are generally disposed toward ISDS.
In response to continued criticism of ISDS by Warren in May, this time alleging that it could be used by a trade agreement party to undermine US banking reforms, President Obama countered that Warren "is absolutely wrong" in her discussion of possible implications if Congress grants him TPA. He ridiculed the idea that he would conclude a trade agreement (this time the TTIP) that would permit foreign investors to undercut US financial reforms. 132 Seldom has a sitting president issued such a ringing endorsement of regional trade agreements, including a defence of their ISDS provisions (or expressed as much frustration with members of his own party) -although personalizing the criticism may not, in the author's view, have been the wisest approach. Of the rules tilted against labor and for global capital in these proposed agreements, one of the most egregious is investor-to-state dispute settlement, or ISDS. ISDS provides extraordinary legal rights to foreign investors so that they can seek taxpayer reimbursement for losses to expected profits from laws, regulations, administrative decisions or virtually any other government measure. The rights protected go far beyond traditional property rights and its private tribunals are staffed not by professional jurists sworn to promote the public interest, but by for-profit attorneys, many of whom represent investors when they are not sitting in judgment. 133 This particular critique was among those that raised the issue of conflicts of interest by arbitrators, 134 one that the TPP makes some effort to address. And Public Citizen has continued to attack the TPP and the TPA, as it has with other trade arrangements incorporating ISDS, using arguments similar to those made by organized labour. 135 In the recent TPA-related debate, disparate groups of law professors sequentially attacked and defended the inclusion of ISDS in the TPP and TTIP. The opponents representing the "Alliance for Justice" were led by Dean Erwin Chemerinsky of the University of California Irvine in a one-page letter addressed to congressional leaders and the USTR. 136 The letter criticized, inter alia, the granting of foreign corporations "a special legal privilege" through proceedings that "lack many of the basic protections and procedures of the justice system normally available in a court of law," as well as the absence of appeals and accountability of arbitrators.
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The response, prepared primarily by Andrea Bjorklund, Susan Franck and José Alvarez, and signed by more than 40 other international economic law experts, sought to rebut the criticism in detail. It noted that entering into treaties is one of the "core" elements of national sovereignty and emphasized the procedural protections and transparency in contemporary ISDS mechanisms. 138 Whether either letter had any impact on the well-entrenched views of the various addressees (or the reviewing public) is questionable.
These groups are not the only academic commentators who have waded into the public debate. Jason Yackee, a law professor at the University of Wisconsin, using a Cato Institute forum, has argued that ISDS is not necessary or desirable in trade agreements, focusing on the lack of evidence that BITs and FTAs with investment provisions do much to encourage needed investment in developing countries, and the argument that many foreign investors do not pay much attention to the existence or nonexistence of such ISDS agreements. 139 Nor is there evidence that developed countries such as Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom need the incentive of ISDS; in any event, the problem of mistreatment of foreign investment by host governments may well be exaggerated.
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Yackee also downplays the risk of the repoliticization of investment disputes in the manner that occurred in the United States in the 1970s (as discussed in the second part of this paper). At the same time, he is a skeptic when viewing claims of "regulatory chill" as a result of the existence of ISDS.
141 A greater concern, in his view, is the "massive" number of investment disputes that would likely arise under the 12-nation TPP. Overall, he believes the benefits of ISDS are not likely to be "significant."
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Simon Lester, another trade and investment expert associated with the Cato Institute, argues that it makes more sense to require foreign investors to take responsibility for their business decisions; if they are concerned about expropriation, they can purchase political risk insurance 143 and demand the inclusion of international arbitration clauses in the foreign investment clauses they conclude with foreign governments or foreign government agencies. 144 These views, which effectively advocate the same result -abandonment of ISDS -as the Democratic House and Senate liberals and the many other critics discussed above, have not been persuasive to the Obama administration, Republicans in Congress or business groups. In a more objective, less politicized context it would be interesting to experiment with the alternatives of no ISDS, or to see whether some sort of investment court mechanism could be negotiated. For reasons expressed earlier, the author remains skeptical that this could occur in the foreseeable future.
It is notable that for countries that have declined to conclude investment agreements, such as Brazil, the major alternative for international enterprises investing in Brazil is contract clauses with agreements requiring disputes to be resolved through international commercial arbitration, often at the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. Some 10 percent of that organization's caseload is said to involve disputes between foreign investors and Brazilian state entities. 145 Finally, presidential candidate Hillary Clinton took no position on the TPA or the TPP until after the House vote, despite her strong support of the TPP and the "pivot" to Asia while Secretary of State. Rather, with some equivocation she supported the House Democratic leadership after it had initially managed to block the TPA and Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). In the process, she offered relatively mild criticism of ISDS, noting that in her Hard Choices book she had "sounded a bit of alarm...about the investor-state dispute settlement process...because it's fundamentally an anti-democratic process." Still, she waffled, suggesting that it would matter "who ha[s] a stake in the outcome" and whether state and local governments and NGOs are heard from. 146 Once the negotiations were concluded, Clinton indicated her opposition to the TPP, presumably responding to populist pressure from Senator Bernie Sanders, who at the time was attracting the support of many Democrats.
Investment Protection in the 2015 TPA
Despite the energetic and very public debate in the second quarter of 2015, viewpoints do not seem to have changed, at least among a large majority of senators and members of Congress. The TPA bill, after the acceptance of several amendments (none related to investment), and a Byzantine six weeks of procedural skirmishes, was passed (62-37) by the Senate for the first time on May 22, 2015, and again on June 24 (60-38), 147 with strong cooperation between the president, a dozen pro-trade Democrats and the Republican leadership in the Senate. It passed the House as a stand-alone bill (after TAA for displaced workers had earlier been caused to fail by the Democratic leadership, in the hope that it would kill the TPA as well) by a vote 218-210, with a majority of the Republicans in support but only 28 Democrats voting in favour of their president's most important second-term legislative initiative. 148 Ultimately, President Obama signed the TPA legislation on June 29, 2015, 149 after the House had relented and provided broad bipartisan support to a separate TAA bill that was signed as well. 150 No parts of this debate changed the content of TPA negotiating objectives in major respects as they relate to ISDS and related investment issues. The treatment of key areas -such as fair and equitable treatment; expropriation; transparency; procedures to eliminate frivolous claims; endorsement of an appellate body, as well as the continuing overarching desire to limit foreign investor rights in the (iv) providing for an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of investment provisions in trade agreements; and (H) ensuring the fullest measure of transparency in the dispute settlement mechanism, to the extent consistent with the need to protect information that is classified or business confidential, by-(i) ensuring that all requests for dispute settlement are promptly made public;
(ii) ensuring that-(I) all proceedings, submissions, findings, and decisions are promptly made public; and (II) all hearings are open to the public; and (iii) establishing a mechanism for acceptance of amicus curiae submissions from businesses, unions, and nongovernmental organizations. 152 In other words, the endorsement of ISDS by President Obama and the US Congress was fully consistent with the US investment protection policies developed since 2002, again reflecting a continuing process of refinements in the direction of greater host state regulatory flexibility, as reflected in the TPP text as discussed in the next section of this paper. Given that the 2015 TPA objectives will be in force for six years, they will apply to the TTIP negotiations as well. In this author's view there will not likely be a TTIP without at least some form of ISDS, although it is premature to consider the outcome of negotiations that will not be concluded before late 2017 at the earliest. Still, it seems unlikely that any US president who decides to pursue the TTIP negotiations, given the need for continuing business community support, would seek to conclude the negotiation without significant levels of protection for foreign investment.
THE LATEST ACT: THE TPP
In recent years, the Obama administration has supported negotiations of three US agreements with ISDS: the TPP, the US-China BIT and the TTIP. With the enactment of the TPA, every effort was made to conclude the TPP promptly and success was announced on October 5, 2015. 153 Conclusion of the USChina BIT and the TTIP remain for a future president and are not discussed here. Even with the signing of the TPP on February 4, 2016, its ultimate fate is unclear, given the ongoing disagreements discussed earlier and the vagaries of the 2016 presidential election cycle.
The last issues to be resolved in the TPP were largely unrelated to ISDS (dairy market access in Canada; rice, beef and auto market access in Japan; sugar market access in the United States and Mexico; and Canada's insistence on higher regional value content for autos and small trucks to protect its auto and auto parts industries' preferred access to the US and Canadian markets; and US efforts to expand patent protection for biologic drugs). 154 With the negotiations completed and the text public, the bitter debate has, as predicted, resumed, 155 with the president, most Republicans in Congress and business interests on one hand, and most Democrats, organized labour and various NGOs on the other. 156 The outcome in Congress for the TPP is uncertain. Because of TPA requirements, it could not be signed by President Obama for 90 days after it was concluded 157 on February 4, 2016, or sent to Congress until well into the second quarter of 2016. 158 For political reasons, the TPP may not be transmitted to Congress until after the November elections. 159 Approval (or rejection) of the agreement may thus await a new Congress and a new president in 2017.
The investment chapter maintains ISDS for both developed and developing country parties. Earlier opposition by Australia to ISDS in principle seems to have disappeared with the most recent change in government. 160 A series of exceptions to national treatment and non-discrimination remains, as in previous FTAs. In addition, there are a number of important innovations beyond even the most recent US FTA investment chapters and the 2015 TPA. Such modifications reflect the fact that there were 12 nations with diverse views and legal systems at the table, but also the leadership by the Obama administration in seeking to balance the need to protect US investors abroad with increasing host state regulatory flexibility. As Melida Hodgson writes, "TPP's chapter on Investment strengthens the rule of law in the Asia-Pacific region, deters foreign governments from imposing discriminatory or abusive requirements on American investors, and protects the right to regulate in the public interest, and building on US experience since NAFTA, the innovations take investment agreements to a new level in terms of protecting host state discretion in such areas as guarding the government's regulatory discretion in such areas as public health and the environment." 161 The TPP investment chapter generally includes much language that is broadly similar to that of earlier US FTAs (such as Singapore and CAFTA-DR), providing for preliminary consideration of procedural issues, 162 and for transparency in respect to arbitral pleadings and open hearings. 163 (This result is reinforced by the fact that at least two of the TPP parties have signed the UN Transparency Convention, an extension of the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules adopted in 2014. 164 ) TPP tribunals would retain the authority to "accept and consider" amicus curiae submissions, but with the caveat that the submission must be "regarding a matter of fact or law within the scope of the dispute that may assist the tribunal in evaluating the submissions and arguments of the disputing parties." 165 The language found in US FTA investment chapters since Chile and Singapore, defining "customary international law" as resulting from "a general and consistent practice of states that they follow from a sense of legal obligation" remains in place, 166 as does the now-traditional expropriation annex, including (with minor changes in word order) these key words: "Non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations, except in rare circumstances." 167 The incorporation of the Singapore language defining "fair and equitable treatment" as including "The obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world" remains. 168 
